AUKUS has furthered the divide in Transatlantic relations and given Europe another push in their pursuit for ‘strategic autonomy’. It has also raised the stakes in Asia Pacific even if it does not, in its current form and given agreed timelines, mark a before and after in the region’s balance of power. This brief provides a short account of some of the key implications of this important development in international relations.

  1. AUKUS is a limited tripartite military-security partnership that falls short of a bilateral or collective security alliance. AUKUS is an agreement announced in September 2021 between Australia, the US and the UK to cooperate in matters of defence, military technology and intelligence. The core of the agreement includes the purchase by Australia of eight nuclear-powered submarines armed with conventional weapons. But unlike NATO’s Article 5, AUKUS does not include any provision tying one of the parties to the others in case of foreign attack. AUKUS also falls short of the provisions built into the 1951 ANZUS Treaty setting out that the US and Australia should come to the help of each other in case of foreign attack.
  2. As an Anglo-Western partnership excluding France and the European Union, AUKUS has furthered the divide in Transatlantic relations. Up until AUKUS, the French thought they were about to sign a similar deal with Australia which involved defence cooperation and the latter’s purchase of diesel-powered submarines. But Canberra withdrew from the deal without any advance notice – not even during the UK-hosted G7 summit in June – leaving the French without a lucrative deal and feeling publicly humiliated. France’s accusation of betrayal and elevation of the matter to European levels, and Washington’s lukewarm response, have dealt another blow to Transatlantic relations following years of US-EU distancing and Washington’s withdrawal from Afghanistan where EU powers were not consulted.
  3. France’s exclusion by AUKUS powers makes little sense from a strategic perspective, yet it may give Europe the push needed to pursue ‘strategic autonomy’. In France’s Indo Pacific Strategy, announced by President Macron in 2018 in Australia of all places, Paris states that “the Indo-Pacific region is a priority for French diplomacy”. Indeed, France has several territories, 1.7 million citizens and a 8,000 strong military presence in the Indo Pacific, more than the remaining 26 EU member states combined. Yet despite this and their historic and NATO ties, AUKUS powers have deemed it unnecessary or contrary to their interests to involve France. This adds momentum to France-led EU efforts to pursue strategic autonomy and promote a third way in the Indo Pacific which emphasises trade and multilateralism.
  4. AUKUS does not mark a before and after in the balance of power of the Asia Pacific region but it raises the stakes higher. AUKUS does not refer to China by name, but it has come into being to meet the challenge of a rising and more assertive China at a time where relations between Beijing and Canberra are at their lowest. China will take notice of the fact that AUKUS does not include mutual defence provisions, but it will equally take notice that should the partnership deliver on its promises then it will face an additional eight nuclear-powered submarines cruising its immediate vicinity (although this may not happen before 2030 and beyond, as it will take long before the said submarines are built and delivered). In this regard, should a future armed conflict take place between the US and China, it is not unreasonable to assume that the US will call onto Australia’s brand-new submarine force.

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