The spectacular rise of ISIS in 2014 has been followed by what, on the surface, appears to be the group’s equally rapid demise. Meanwhile, Al-Qaeda has undergone significant change since US special commandos killed Osama Bin Laden in 2011. But has ISIS truly been defeated or does it still hold enough power to threaten global peace? Has it disintegrated or has it gone underground and is preparing an insurgency? Is Al-Qaeda as weakened as it appears to be or does it still hold enough power to pose a serious challenge? And more importantly, what is the future of Jihadism in this ever-evolving landscape of Islamic militancy?
Jihadism: a modern revolutionary movement
As all ‘isms’ before it, Jihadism is an elusive concept prone to misinterpretation and misappropriation. More importantly, it is an evolving and fluid concept which, in its contemporary and global violent conception, grew out of the battlefields of Afghanistan during the Soviet invasion of the 1980s. Of all attempts at defining the phenomenon and its more recent, Sunni-led manifestations, the most convincing one was provided by the International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation (ICSR) in a 2016 paper entitled The New Jihadism: A Global Snapshot.
There, the authors defined the modern global strand of Jihadism as a combination of two factors. The first is an understanding of and belief in jihad that goes beyond its basic and widely accepted spiritual core to embrace and pursue a violent fight against non-believers and oppressors of the Umma or the global community of Muslim believers. The second factor is the movement’s embrace of Salafism, a puritanical version of Sunni Islam that seeks to recreate the doctrine, customs and laws present in the times that followed the death of the Prophet Mohammed. A more recent 2018 report by the Centre for Strategic & International Studies (CSIS), called The Evolution of the Salafi-Jihadist Threat, provides an almost identical definition.
In his books Al-Qaeda and The New Threat from Islamic Militancy, Jason Burke traces the roots of the modern global Jihadism to a number of historical figures in Political Islam including Abul A’la Maududi, the Pakistani political philosopher, Hassan al-Banna, founder of the Muslim Brotherhood, Sayyid Qutb, charged and hanged for plotting the assassination in 1961 of Egypt’s President Gamal Abdel Nasser, and more recently Abdullah Yusuf Azzam, the Palestinian Sunni scholar and founder of Al-Qaeda. Osama Bin Laden, co-founder of Al-Qaeda, is credited with turning jihad into an individual duty born by every Muslim against the enemies of Islam.
The literalist interpretation of Islam and the spectacular attacks and violence perpetrated by jihadist groups, most notably Al-Qaeda and ISIS, have led many to describe them as medieval and to use reductionist explanations to portray them purely as ‘terrorist’. However, jihadi groups of the kind described here make a use of violence that in many ways is reminiscent of the terror tactics deployed by Jacobin revolutionaries during the French Revolution. At the same time, they use modern technology and communications channels to co-ordinate attacks and spread their message.
Taking all these different ingredients together, the ICSR provides the following all-encompassing definition of Jihadism: “a modern revolutionary political ideology mandating the use of violence to defend or promote a particular, very narrow vision of Sunni islamic understandings”. The emphasis, despite the groups’ medieval narrative and imagery, is on the qualifiers ‘modern’ and ‘revolutionary’. Equally important is the Sunni ingredient of this form of violent Islamist militancy, which excludes Shia groups such as Lebanon’s Iran-backed Hezbollah.
The Jihadi landscape: from global aspirants to lone wolves
Another very important aspect of this strand of Jihadism is that it is a global phenomenon straddling regions, borders and cultures, and impacting the lives of thousands across the globe. Indeed, according to findings of the Global Extremism Monitor,
“there were 7,841 attacks in 48 countries in 2017, and related counter-measures in a total of 66 countries. Extremism affected 18 of the world’s most developed countries. A total of 121 violent Islamist groups were active in 2017. Of these, 92 perpetrated violence in at least one country. Nigeria’s Boko Haram and Mali’s Jamaat Nasr al-Islam wal Muslimin demonstrated the fluidity of violence across the Sahel and Lake Chad Basin, instigating attacks in four countries each.”
In The New Threat, Jason Burke dissects the global jihadist movement and breaks it down into three broad types of jihadi groups, based on factors such as the extent of their aspirations and reach, their ability to carry out global operations and attacks, their place and leadership in the jihadi landscape, and the level of threat they pose to peace and stability both in their immediate areas of operation but also to Muslims and Western societies at large.
First there are violent Islamic militant groups with global aspirations and operations. ISIS and Al-Qaeda are the two most prominent groups falling within this category. The second category is made of localised Islamic militant groups who are either independent from groups in the first category or affiliated to either of such groups. Examples include Somalia’s Al-Qaeda-affiliated al-Shabaab or Nigeria’s ISIS-affiliated Boko Haram. The third category is made of individuals driven by their own beliefs or inspired by violent Islamic propaganda emanating from any of the above groups. Lone wolf attacks in Western cities fall under the last category.
Naturally, indiscriminate attacks against civilians in Western cities have attracted much media attention in the West. Yet, as per findings of the Global Extremism Monitor, “nearly two-thirds of all attacks aimed at the public space in 2017 occurred in Sunni Muslim–majority states. An ideology that systematically legitimises the targeting of two broad groups—Muslims deemed to be heretics for failing to answer the call to jihad and non-Muslims of a faith or of no faith at all—is simultaneously exploiting and exacerbating community tensions around the world.”
ISIS vs Al-Qaeda
Undoubtedly, the two organisations that are seen to pose the greatest challenge to regional governments and global powers are those with universal aspirations, namely ISIS and Al-Qaeda. The two organisations have been locked in a contest for the leadership of the Sunni Islamic militancy landscape and the two possess significant power and resources, including the ability to launch attacks and destabilise societies and galvanise support. The two organisations bear a number of similarities, but their differences are equally striking.
Originally an off-shoot of Al-Qaeda, ISIS led the insurgency in post-Saddam Hussain Iraq under the leadership of the Jodanian jihadist Abu Musab al-Zarqawi. However, tensions with Al-Qaeda core resulted in their separation and by 2014 ISIS had become the most well-known and feared jihadi group in the world. In the space of months, it conquered vast swathes of territory – controlling around eight to ten million people – in Syria and Iraq to launch its version of a Muslim Caliphate and to put an end to the Anglo-French humiliation of the early twentieth century, when the Sykes-Picot agreement carved out the Middle East into different spheres of influence.
ISIS’s leader Al-Zarqawi died in an air raid in 2006 and was later succeeded by Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, a former prisoner of the US-administered Iraqi detention centre Camp Bucca. In 2014, al-Baghdadi spoke from the altar of the Grand Mosque in Mosul, where he claimed to descend from the Prophet Mohammed to hold the title of Caliph. His speech reverberated everywhere in the Islamic militancy world, acting as a magnet for regional and foreign fighters – including large numbers of Western citizens – who flocked to Syria and Iraq in numbers unseen since the 1980s. With the stroke of a speech, first-class global social media propaganda, terror tactics and a series of consecutive ‘blitzkrieg’ campaigns, ISIS emerged as the new face of Islamic extremism.
But was it so at the expense of Al-Qaeda? Or in other words, was and is ISIS the natural heir of Al-Qaeda or do they harbour sufficient differences both in substance and form to rule out a ‘take-over’ theory? The reality, as anticipated above and illustrated in the table below, is that, despite the similarities between the two groups, most notably the pursuit of a global Islamic State founded upon and organised by a literal interpretation of Sunni Islam, they harbour significant differences.
| Al-Qaeda | ISIS | |
|---|---|---|
| Doctrinal foundation | Sunni, puritanical, literalist, pragmatist | Sunni, puritanical, literalist, apocalyptic view of the world as a cosmic battle between good and evil that is happening now |
| Principal attributes | Brutal, patient, pragmatist, long-term player | Brutal, all-or-nothing attitude, immediate results |
| Vision | Global Islamic State governed by Sharia Law | Global Islamic State governed by Sharia Law |
| Strategy | Long game: acceptance that the coming of a Global Islamic State is a multi-generational objective | Short game: a Global Islamic State must be established now and defended through expansion |
| Tactics | Set up a stronghold in war and conflict-torn regions; franchise out with clear allegiance to the core leadership; large-scale attacks on Western interests; educate Shia and non-believers | Blitzkrieg campaigns, terrorising local populations and use of social media propaganda; exploit sectarian tensions and divisions by targeting Shia communities and apostate governments |
| Primary enemy | Under Bin Laden, Al-Qaeda targeted the far enemy first (i.e. US and allies) usually through funding and support of local cells targeting Western interests and populations in the West; Bin Laden’s successor, Ayman al-Zawahiri shifted the focus by concentrating on the far enemy in the near lands of the Middle East – but with exceptions (e.g. Charlie Hebdo attacks in Paris in 2015) | Near enemy first (i.e. Shia Muslims, apostate governments, unbelievers) |
| Secondary enemy | Apostate governments | Far enemy but less so through direct funding and support of cells and more so by inspiring attacks |
| Treatment of transnational borders | Respect for transnational borders and patrons (e.g. Taliban in Afghanistan), until the conditions are created for the launch of an Islamic State from which to wage war | Seeks to redraw the boundaries of the Muslim ‘heartlands’ with immediate effect; at war with competing national groups such as the Taliban |
| System of governance | Does not seek to govern populations and territory directly, at least not immediately or until a Global Islamic State is implemented | Seeks to govern populations and territory directly through system of local governance based on provinces and local affiliates |
What next for Jihadism?
On paper, Al-Qaeda has more experience than ISIS in going underground only to resurface again later in another part of the world. This does not mean that ISIS cannot and will not play a similar game now that it has lost its Syrian and Iraqi Caliphate. In fact, ISIS’s origins as a Sunni-led Iraqi insurgency against the US and the Iraqi Shia government of Nouri al-Maliki suggest that the group may go back to its insurgency roots, if only temporarily and until the conditions allow it to launch another territorial stronghold.
What is clear, however, is that ISIS has succeeded in permeating the Islamic militancy debate and that wherever its leaders, followers and affiliates pop up next, they will continue to exploit existing sectarian fault lines. This will continue to cause significant challenges in the Muslim heartlands of the Middle East, where Shia Muslims make up between a third and half of the total Muslim population and where other significantly large minorities exist. Similarly, it will put the unstable region of the Sahel to test, where weak states, porous borders, and violent Salafi groups combine to create a fertile ground for ISIS.
In the meantime, Al-Qaeda remains a very powerful actor with a number of equally powerful affiliates, especially Al-Qaeda in the Maghreb and Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula. Arguably, although weakened after the death of Osama Bin Laden in 2011 and the ascent of his less charismatic successor Ayman al-Zawahiri, the rise of ISIS and the consequent focus of counter-terrorist agencies on the latter has given Al-Qaeda significant breathing space to reorganise and regroup. Al-Zawahiri’s instructions not to attack the West in the West are more a smart tactic than a change of heart as to who the real enemy is, suggesting a likely resumption of hostilities and attacks as and when convenient to the group.
Jihadism is a fluid and changing phenomenon and just as mergers and acquisitions change the ever-evolving corporate landscape, so the jihadi landscape can and will continue to evolve as a result of splinters, mergers, take overs and competition. According to the CSIS, in 2018 there were 67 Salafi-Jihadist groups representing a 180% increase since 2001. One such group that has attracted less attention in the West is Jabhat Fatah al-Sham, previously known as Jabat al-Nusra or as Al-Qaeda in Syria.
This group recently changed its name once more to Hay’at Tahrir Al Sham (HTS) following its merger with another four Islamist groups in Syria. This merge and take-over was rejected by Al-Qaeda central who broke off its patronage of the group, in turn leading to overt hostilities between the two. HTS remains mostly a local and regional actor whose aim is to defeat Syrian government forces and their Shia allies with a view to replacing them with an Islamic State. However, as seen before with ISIS, what begins as a local enterprise can rapidly change into a broader project if backed by victory and expansion.
The situation is likely to remain very fluid and extremist militants and fighters may change allegiance or membership, in turn weakening or emboldening one group or another. For example, ISIS fighters under siege in Syria may end up joining HTS or Al-Qaeda as they flee the advances of the Syrian government forces and Russian and Coalition air strikes. Others may try to move down to Yemen or across to the Sahel. Whether or not they will change allegiance and membership will depend on many factors including these groups’ leadership, resources and, at times, mere survival.
What about foreign fighter returnees?
As per the thousands of Western fighters who have joined ISIS and escaped death or capture, the question remains whether they will seek to return to their home countries, thus potentially posing a threat to Western populations from within, or stay or move to other conflict-torn areas. According to a ICSR report published in July 2018 and entitled From Daesh to ‘Diaspora’: Tracing the Women and Minors of Islamic State, a total of 41,490 people from 80 countries joined ISIS in Syria and Iraq, of which 7,366 are thought to have returned to their countries of origin. Many others have died or do not wish to return at all.
Do returnees pose a threat? The question is almost rhetorical but it also depends on a number of factors including the ability of governments to implement effective reintegration policies, the dying down of Salafi-Jihadist online broadcasting following ISIS’s loss of territory and hence the loss of a base from which to launch their social media campaigns, and a smart use of domestic counter-narratives aimed at overcoming the apocalyptic message of ISIS and other groups.
Experts predict that the current levels of threat from both lone wolfs and terrorist cells will continue over the medium term. Surely some of these returnees will find a deterrent in their social fabric back at home, as well as that of their family, friends and acquaintances. Indeed, many left their home country attracted by the idea of a nascent and completely different world in the Islamic State but may have been disappointed at what they found. Others, however, will no doubt return even more radicalised and with battlefield experience, potentially eager to find at home the death they did not meet in Syria or Iraq.
